In distinct experiments we examined memories for orientation and size. After viewing a randomly oriented Gabor patch (or a plain white disk of random size), observers were given unlimited time to reproduce as faithfully as possible the orientation (or size) of that standard stimulus with an adjustable Gabor patch (or disk). Then, with this match stimulus still in view, a recognition probe was presented. On half the trials, this probe was identical to the standard. We expected observers to classify the probe (a same/different task) on the basis of its difference from the match, which should have served as an explicit memory of the standard. Observers did better than that. Larger differences were classified as "same" when probe and standard were indeed identical. In some cases, recognition performance exceeded that of a simulated observer subject to the same matching errors, but forced to adopt the single most advantageous criterion difference between the probe and match. Recognition must have used information that was not or could not be exploited in the reproduction phase.
Introduction
In conventional recognition experiments, observers try their best to remember a standard stimulus, but memory is not perfect. The precision of those memories may be inferred from their recognition responses using Signal-Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966) , but with one crucial assumption; namely that observers use the same decision strategy (i.e. criterion) on every trial. Sophisticated theorists (notably Wickelgren, 1968) have already acknowledged that decision criteria may fluctuate. The problem remains that this fluctuation is indistinguishible from memory noise in most paradigms. Evidence that decision criteria depend systematically on trial-by-trial feedback was first presented by Tanner, Rauk, and Atkinson (1970) . Treisman and Williams (1984) later codified several previously reported sequential effects in their Criterion Setting Theory.
Our own research is situated within this alternative tradition. We introduce a paradigm in which criterion fluctuation demonstrably improves recognition performance.
In our paradigm, criterion fluctuation can be advantageous only if it complements a similar fluctuation in the precision of memory. After 150 years (see p. 82 of Fechner, 1860 Fechner, /1966 , this idea of variable precision is only now finding its way into signal-detection models (notably that of van den Berg, Shin, Chou, George, and Ma, 2012) . To get a handle on the trial-by-trial fluctuation in memory noise, we required observers to match their memory of each standard with an adjustable stimulus. We then computed the best possible recognition performances, assuming that reproduction errors reflected a memory noise with constant precision. The fact that our observers' recognition performances exceeded these predictions allows us to infer that memory noise has variable precision. This would be insufficient to allow better-than-prediction recognition if observers' decision criteria did not co-vary with their memory noise.
Our empirical approach (summed up in the Abstract and detailed in the Methods) consisted of a matching (recollection) task followed by a same/different (recognition) task. This approach allows us to characterise decision strategies for recognition with respect to explicit representations of the imperfectly recollected standards. Such a feat is impossible with standard yes/no procedures. As will be shown, our observers' decision behaviour is consistent with a doubly stochastic memory noise model where observers modulate their decision criterion in the recognition phase in inverse proportion with their confidence in their match. To our knowledge, the present experiments are the first to provide empirical evidence of a systematic, trial-by-trial modulation of recognition strategy, in accordance with observers' confidence in each memory of the standard stimulus.
Methods

Units
In this paper, all Gabor orientations (s, m, m0, and p; see below) have units of degree, clockwise with respect to horizontal. All disk sizes (also s, m, m0, and p) are quantified as logarithms (base 10) of diameter.
Stimuli
Gabor patches or white disks (see Figure 1 ) were presented on a 15" MacBook Pro computer at a comfortable viewing distance of about 0.5 m. At this distance, each Gabor was centred 3 degrees of visual angle to the left or right of a central fixation spot. The white disks were displayed at the same mean eccentricity but their positions were randomly jittered, across and within trials, ±1°. Each Gabor was the product of a sinusoidal luminance grating and a Gaussian luminance envelope. The grating had a spatial frequency of 1.5 cycles per degree and a random spatial phase. The Gaussian envelope had a space constant (σ) of 0.5 degrees of visual angle. Both grating and envelope had maximum contrast. The white disks had a luminance of 260 cd/m². Stimuli were presented on a grey, 60 cd/m² background. selected with each keypress. To indicate satisfaction with the match's orientation (or size, m), the observer pressed the space bar, initiating the trial's second, recognition phase. With the match still in view, a probe Gabor (or disk) was presented at the location of the standard. On 50% of trials the orientation (or size, p) of the probe was identical to s. In the remaining trials the orientation (or size) of p was was changed with respect to s by a value, ±Δs. 2 The value of Δs was held constant within each block of trials. In the orientation experiment, Δs took values of 3°, 5°, 7°, 14°, and 21°. In the size experiment, Δs took values of 0.04, 0.06, and 0.08. Observers had to classify p as either "same" or "different" with respect to their memory of s. No feedback was given. Observers performed two blocks of 100 trials at each level of difficulty in a random order. Two additional 50-trial blocks (one with Δs = 3°, the other with Δs = 5°) were run by the first author in the orientation experiment and were included in all subsequent analyses.
Figure 1 (about here)
1 Perfect matches (i.e. where m = s) were consequently impossible, but note that these step sizes were much smaller than the average matching error (i.e. SD [s -m] 
Observers
Two authors and two naïve observers were run in the orientation experiment.
The same two authors and three naïve observers (one of which, KM, also participated in the orientation experiment) were run in the size experiment.
Results
Gross indices of reproduction can be obtained by computing the standard deviation of each observer's matching errors (s -m). Across observers, these indices had a mean and standard deviation (SD) of 9.6° and 0.7°, respectively, for orientation, 3 and 0.048 and 0.013, respectively, for size (see Tables SM1 and SM2 in (Fechner, 1860 (Fechner, /1966 . For each observer, recognition responses were also segregated according to the level of difficulty (Δs). They were then maximum-likelihood fit with psychometric functions based on the cumulative Normal distribution:
Finally, a series of hypotheses regarding the decision criterion (μ) and the SD of its fluctuation (σ) were subjected to chi-square tests based on the generalized likelihood ratio (Mood, Graybill & Boes, 1974) . In the data from both experiments, we found significant (at the α = 0.05 level) changes in the criterion with observer, difficulty and probe identity, but changes in the standard deviation of its fluctuation were significant only when observer and difficulty changed, not when the probe identity changed. Therefore, we constrained σP ≠S = σP=S for all of our fits. ( To quantify the advantage of that additional information, we can compare each observer's overall performance in the recognition phase (red symbols in Figure   4 ) with the performance of a psychometrically matched observer not privvy to any such information. The latter performance (green symbols) was computed using decision criteria that were sampled at random from the Normal distribution equal to the two-parameter psychometric function (i.e. μP ≠S = μP=S = μ and σP ≠S = σP=S = σ in Equation 1) that best fit the human observer's data. Each green symbol in Figure 4 shows the psychometrically matched observer's overall performance after 1000 trials with each of the human observer's 200 matching errors. In 18 of 20 cases (the exceptions were KM, Δs = 5° and HLW, Δs = 3°) our human observers' performances exceeded those of psychometrically matched model observers (i.e.
significantly more than 50%, using a binomial test; P < 0.001). We must infer that the two-parameter psychometric functions did not capture all of the information used by our human observers in the recognition task. Not only were their decisions based on something besides |p -m|, that additional information enhanced overall performances. In the size experiment, human recognition performance ( Figure 5 , red symbols) was better than that of psychometrically matched observers (green symbols) in 13 of 15 cases (i.e. also significantly more than 50%; same test; the exceptions were PS, Δs=0.04 and Δs=0.08). A description of the blue and yellow symbols appears below, under Regression-based Models. The fact that our human observers out-performed psychometrically matched observers implies that the former used information besides | p -m | when deciding "same" or "different." We will now demonstrate that the present recognition results are consistent with an observer whose criterion varies from trial-to-trial with the precision of each memory trace. Although we have no evidence that this criterion placement reflects a conscious strategy, we will use the term "confidence" to describe the underlying variable. When observers are confident that their still-visible match is good (i.e. close to the standard), they effectively label all but the most similar probes as "different." When observers have low confidence in their match, they show a greater willingness to accept some of those same probes as "same."
Of course, if observers' confidence in each match bore no relation to its actual accuracy, then we would not expect any advantage of a trial-by-trial decision criterion modulation in the recognition task. Therefore, as an initial investigation into the viability of our idea, we re-fit the aforementioned psychometric functions when recognition decisions were segregated into two equal-sized subsets: those following large matching errors and those following small matching errors. Fitting psychometric functions to each of these subsets separately (see Appendix C) confirmed that our observers adopted larger criterion values of |p -m| when their matching errors were large. This is in line with studies reporting that confidence (at the time of the test) and accuracy are based (at least partly) on the same source of information (such as memory strength; Busey, Tunncliff, & Loftus, 2000) and that subjects have (conscious or unconscious)
access to the fidelity of their memory (the trace access theory; Hart, 1967; Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991) .
The variable-precision, ideal-observer Model
To demonstrate that a greater reluctance to say "different" when memory fidelity is low translates into an advantage for recognition over the case where observers' same/different responses are independent of their confidence, we simulated the performance of an observer whose matching errors (s -m) were randomly selected from a an inverse Gamma distribution:
Essentially, this means that memory noise (or some correlated variable such as 
5 It may be easier to first consider an observer with a more extreme case of nonstationarity. This observer either perfectly remembers (R) or entirely forgets (F) the standard S. In the former case, his response will be "same" for p = s trials and "different" otherwise. When this observer forgets, he will respond randomly whether p = s or not. The probabilities of a "different" response when p = s and p ≠ s are then given by:
. 6 In these equations we use varX to denote the squared SD of X.
which is guaranteed to be greater than zero. Although this formula contains two parameters, we really have only one free parameter, because var S − M ( ) is something we measure:
We can approximate ordinary Signal-Detection Theory by adopting a large value for a. Fluctuations in memory noise will be largest when we adopt a small value for a.
We simulated the behaviour of the "ideal" observer (see performance is similar to that of our human observers. It also exceeds that of a psychometrically matched observer (green symbols) by an amount similar to that seen in our human observers' data.
Regression-based Models
The main point of our paper is that decision strategies co-vary with uncertainty, which fluctuates over trials. A separate but interesting issue is the degree to which uncertainty fluctuations are due to external factors such as the oblique effect. Once that question has been answered, any remaining variability must be ascribed to internal factors such as arousal and attention. We are not in a position to unequivocally measure the influence of external factors, nonetheless we believe that the regression models described in Appendix A represent a good first step in that direction. They provide estimates for the precision (the reciprocal of variable error) of each observer's memory given any values of s and
m0.
To see how well our observers could have done, given knowledge of these external effects on uncertainty, we simulated the recognition behaviour of model observers whose memory noise was affected in the same way by s and m0. These regression-based model observers adopted ideal criteria on the basis of each trial's combination s and m0.
We have illustrated the performances of these regression-based models using dark yellow symbols in Figs. 4 and 5. In 20 of 34 cases these performances were inferior compared to the human performances from which they were derived.
(There was one tie.) This result suggests, in these 20 cases at least, that some uncertainty fluctuation should be ascribed to internal factors, and that our observers were able to adjust their criteria in concert with these fluctuations.
The question remains whether our human observers were able to exploit the systematic variations in their matching errors, which were revealed by our regression analyses, for the purposes of making better recognition responses. To address this question, we correlated their responses with those of the aforementioned regression-based models, as well as with the responses of another model observer, whose criteria were fixed with respect to |p -m|, but "otherwise ideal," i.e. they optimised overall performance, given the sample variance in each condition's matching errors (i.
e. Var[s -m]).
Any excess correlation between our observers' responses and those of the regression-based models (relative to the "ideal fixed-criterion" model) would indicate at least some criterion adjustment on the basis of external factors. As can be seen in Table 1 , excess correlation was present in just 3 out of 9. In no cases did the two correlations differ by more than (0.03). Thus we have little evidence in favour of our observers exploiting the oblique effect or other other external influences on the precisions of their memories when adjusting criteria for recognition. Therefore, we would like to suggest that the bulk of their uncertainty-based criterion fluctuations were due to internal factors (e.g. attention and arousal). quite a bit higher than any derived from our humans' data. This suggests that some criterion fluctuation is independent of uncertainty.
Discussion
The present experimental paradigm, consisting in the successive measurement of reproduction and recognition performances, allowed the assessment of the trial-by-trial decisional behaviour in recognition of two stored visual features, orientation and size. Our results show that recognition is better than can be expected from the prior explicit retrieval of the standard (through reproduction) under the usual assumption that subjects use a single decision criterion: the decision criterion for a "different" response when probe and standard were actually the same was more stringent (i.e. required a larger difference between the probe and the visible match) than when the probe and standard were not the same.
Our data support the view that observers do not maintain stable criteria for recognition. It should be understood that the observed criterion changes are not the consequence of the probe presentation but are modulated prior to it according to observers' confidence in their match. In its turn, the latter is related to the noisiness of the memory trace (or of the coding process) as reflected by the difference between match and standard. When the probe is identical to the standard (i.e. "signal" trials), absolute differences between standard (= probe) and match are a direct reflection of this noise (memory strength or coding efficiency, hence of the confidence) associated with that trial (Busey et al., 2000) .
Thus, large differences between probe and match will be associated with large criterion settings. When the probe differs from the standard, probe vs. match differences will be less correlated with the memory/coding noise and hence will not correlate with observers' criteria. As a consequence, both data and modeling
show that observers uniformly demonstrate a greater willingness to accept probes as identical to the standard when they really are, regardless of their similarity to the match.
Simulations confirm that such criterion-setting strategy is consistent with a with lower confidence levels. This finding supersedes the possibility that the observed advantage of human's recognition over an ideal observer using a unique decision criterion was due to the fact that our probe was presented at the same retinal location as the standard, while reproduction was performed at a different location (Dwight, Latrice & Chris, 2008) . Running the whole experiment with probe and match locations swapped would provide a direct test of this conjecture and is one of our future experiments.
Our modeling of the present results is based on two critical premises. The first premise is that the storage (or coding) of visual features is a doubly stochastic process. While this premise cannot be tested directly, it has recently received strong support from a study (van den Berg, Shin et al., 2012) Our second premise is that, consciously or not, recognition strategies vary from trial-to-trial with memory precision. In standard SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) , observers set their decision criterion within a few trials and stick to it inasmuch as the internal and decision noise permit.
Confidence is thought of as reflecting the distance between the current internal response and this criterion, the rationale underlying ROC functions. In the context of the present memory task, we propose the inverse scheme whereby, based on a trial-by-trial estimation of the memory trace strength (or noisiness), confidence is established first, and the criterion is set accordingly: the lower the confidence, the higher the criterion. This sequence implies a variable-precision memory trace with this precision (or some correlated variable) accessible on each trial (e.g. Hart, 1967; Burke et al., 1991; Koriat, 1993 Koriat, , 1995 . Future experiments are needed to establish the empirical link between noise and confidence.
Our data and analyses do not allow an unequivocal distinction between internal and external effects on uncertainty. We constructed models for how matching errors (in particular, their variances) might depend on the external factors of starting error and standard value (i.e. the oblique effect). According to these models, the external influences on uncertainty were not large enough to fully account for the observed criterial fluctuations. Nonetheless, alternative models can be formulated. If such models can account for more of the variance in matching errors, then it is possible they might also account for more, if not all of the criterial fluctuation apparent in our data. However, the main point of our paper would remain valid, namely that recognition criteria co-vary with uncertainty, and uncertainty fluctuates over trials. 7
In conclusion, the present study has revealed a decisional mechanism by means of which recognition improves over predictions based on reproduction performances. Our simulations confirm that an observer who relies on his confidence in his memory's fidelity to adjust his recognition strategy is more inclined to say "different" when a to-be remembered standard and probe actually are different. This was the behavior of our observers.
Appendix A
We begin in this Appendix with the size experiment because the regression models are more straightforward. Orientation will be discussed below.
Specifically we used standard linear regression to model constant error in the size experiment. Constant error can be thought of as an adjustment bias. It is the average matching error (s -m) for any given combination of standard size standard size s and starting size : , The model for constant error in the orientation experiment was previously used for similar purposes by Tomassini, Morgan & Solomon (2010):
In this expression, the parameter c1 determines the overall error size and the parameter c2 determines the (near inter-cardinal) orientations at which the tendency for clockwise errors equals that for anti-clockwise errors. To model the variable error, the residuals in Equation A3 were fit with the following model:
Note that there really is no firm theory behind either of these equations. They are provided merely to produce curves that illustrate the effects of standard orientation and starting error. For example, in Equation (A4), the right-hand side is the sum of two full-wave rectified sine functions, which has been elevated so that its minimum is greater than zero. The fancy bit with the arcsine allows each effect to reach its maximum at an arbitrary orientation without moving the local minima away from -90, 0, and 90°. Large values of v1 correspond to large oblique effects. For observers AG, JAS, KM, and HLW, the best-fitting values for this parameter were 4°, 6°, 4°, and 1°, respectively. That is, some observers (especially JAS) exhibited stronger oblique effects than others (especially HLW). Figure A2 contains scatter plots for orientation. As in Fig. A1 , here the dashed lines contain two standard deviations about the constant error. In this case, both the expected error and its standard deviation were modelled as (two-parameter)
Figure A2 (about here)
lines.
Appendix B
In all our modelling, we assume that each matching error s -m is drawn from a On half the trials, in which probe and standard are identical, the probability density function of is
, where is the Normal probability density function. On the other half of the trials, in which ∆ , the density is
An observer who adopts some arbitrary criterion c, will be correct with probability 1 .
Analytical methods (i.e. Mathematica) were used to find that this function has its maximum at the value ideal-observer Model"). Predicted accuracies were obtained from three hypothetical observers subject to the same matching errors. One of these observers (green symbols) adopted criteria sampled at random from Normal distributions equal to the best fitting psychometric functions of |p -m|. Another observer (blue symbols) adopted the single most advantageous criterion with respect to |p -m|. The third hypothetical observer (dark yellow symbols) adopted the most advantageous criteria, not only with respect to |p -m|, but also with respect to the human observer's expected matching error (as determined from the regression analyses in Appendix A), given the effects of standard (s) and starting (m0) orientations. Red and green symbols have been nudged leftward and blue and yellow symbols have been nudged rightward to facilitate legibility.
Figure 5 (about here). As in Fig. 4 , but for the size experiment and five observers. These trials are those producing matching errors larger than the median |s -m|. 
